We examine pension-cost crowd out of salary expenditures in the public sector using a 15-year data panel of state teacher pension plans spanning the Great Recession. While there is no evidence of salary crowd out prior to the Great Recession, there is a shift in the post-recession years such that a one percent (of salaries) increase in the annual required pension contribution corresponds to a decrease in total teacher salary expenditures of 0.24 percent. The mechanism is changes to the size of the teaching workforce, not changes to teacher wages. An explanation for the effect heterogeneity pre-and post-recession is that public employers are less able to shield the workforce from pension costs during times of fiscal stress. This problem is exacerbated because unlike other benefit costs, such as for health care, pension costs are countercyclical.
Introduction
The balance sheets of public defined-benefit (DB) pension plans have been steadily worsening since the turn of the century. Plans covering public educators are no exception. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Compensation Survey, Costrell (2015) estimates that inflation-adjusted per-pupil pension costs paid by employers have more than doubled from $500 in 2004 to over $1,000 by 2015, on average. The cost increase is driven predominantly by rising unfunded liabilities (Backes et al., 2016) .
As a matter of accounting, pension costs are paid by public employees and their employers, but true incidence is unclear. States and municipalities can respond to the rising costs by raising revenue or borrowing, which puts incidence on taxpayers (or future taxpayers), and/or by cutting expenditures in other areas of the budget, which reduces the quality and availability of services and can affect worker salaries. There is little research aimed at understanding how rising pension costs are being managed by state and local governments, despite growing awareness of the significant impact of these costs on budgets (e.g., Belvedere, 2016; Petrella and Pearson, 2019; Tucker, 2017) .
We contribute to the literature by estimating the incidence of pension costs on salary expenditures for covered public-sector employees. Although reducing salary expenditures for covered workers is just one way to offset rising pension costs, it is an intuitive one, and one that follows naturally from how pension plans collect contributions (i.e., on a "per-head" basis among covered employees). Moreover, our focus on teachers is of interest because research suggests they do not value their DB pension benefits highly (Fitzpatrick, 2015) , yet teacher DB plans are consistently supported by labor groups (Weingarten, 2017) . 1 It may be that the incidence of 1 Fitzpatrick estimates that senior teachers are willing to give up very little in current salary to increase pension compensation -20 cents per present-value dollar of pension benefitsat least at the margin. Studies by Chingos and pension costs on teachers is small, which would help to explain the support DB plans receive from organized labor. 2 But if the incidence is high, it would raise questions as to why teacher labor groups continue to support public DB pension plans. 3 We examine pension-cost incidence using a 15-year national data panel of state teacher plans. Our data on pension-plan finances are taken primarily from plans' Actuarial Valuation Reports (AVRs) and Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs), which we supplement in some cases with data from the Public Plans Database (maintained by the Center on Retirement Research at Boston College). We merge these data with state data on teacher salaries and employment levels from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Our data panel covers the years 2001-2015, spanning the Great Recession.
Our empirical analysis is closely related to a parallel literature on the incidence of health benefit costs (Clemens and Cutler, 2014; Lubotsky and Olson, 2015) . We estimate models that link within-state fluctuations in pension costs to fluctuations in salary expenditures. We also estimate models that allow for a change in the relationship between pension costs and salary expenditures after the 2008 financial crisis. To reduce concerns about endogeneity, we favor models that leverage variation in the actuarially-calculated annual required contribution (ARC) for identification, rather than states' statutory contribution rates. The latter reflect what is actually paid West (2015) , Clark, Hanson, and Mitchell (2016) , and Goldhaber and Grout (2016) find that teachers are split in terms of their preferences for defined-contribution (DC) versus DB retirement benefits, with a large fraction of teachers typically opting into each type of plan when given the choice. 2 Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014) develop a political-economy model consistent with there being low incidence of pension costs on public workers. Indeed, there is evidence from the literature on employee health benefit costs showing that salary incidence is far less than one (Anand, 2016; Baicker and Chandra, 2006; Clemens and Cutler, 2014; Lubotsky and Olson, 2015) , and pension costs are easier to "shroud" than health costs because health costs are not deferred. 3 Even if the incidence on teachers is high and teachers on average do not value their pensions at the cost, the positive position of labor groups on pensions could reflect the underrepresentation of young workers in these groups (Koedel, Ni and Podgursky, 2013) . Unions also leverage pension plan assets to promote other union goals (Even and Macpherson, 2014) and teacher labor groups may not know the incidence of pension costs on salary expenditures (we are not aware of any previous evidence linking pension costs to salary expenditures in the literature).
into a plan but can be manipulated politically. In principle our use of the ARC should allow for clean identification, although we note potential limitations below (which we explore to the extent possible).
Our aggregate models that combine pre-and post-recession data yield suggestive evidence of pension crowd out and our confidence intervals are in line with what has been found for crowdout in the recent health-benefit literature, but none of the estimates are statistically significant.
However, when we allow for differential crowd-out in the pre-and post-recession periods, our models reveal important heterogeneity. Whereas prior to the Great Recession there is no evidence that pension-cost fluctuations influenced teacher salary expenditures, in the post-recession period a one-percentage-point increase in the ARC (i.e., one percent of teacher salaries) corresponds to a 0.24 percent reduction in total salary expenditures. Supplementary models make clear that the negative relationship between pension costs and salary expenditures is driven by changes to the size of the teaching workforce (relative to the counterfactual) and not changes to average teacher salaries. This implies that the quality of educational services has been reduced and teacher workloads have gone up (e.g., in the form or larger class sizes) as a result of rising pension costs since 2008.
An explanation for the pre-and post-recession heterogeneity is that during times of fiscal stress, government agencies are less able to tap revenues and resources from other parts of the budget in order to protect the workforce from rising benefit costs, including pension costs. An aspect of pension financing that likely contributes to this problem is the countercyclical nature of pension cost increases (Yin and Boyd, 2018) . Specifically, when a recession hits the value of assets in the pension plan falls. This lowers the asset-to-liability ratio and triggers higher contributions at a time when public employers are already facing tight constraints. This aspect of pension financing makes it distinct from the financing of other employee benefits, most notably healthcare benefits, which do not depend on investment returns and are thus are less responsive to macroeconomic conditions.
Background
Most public-sector employees, including public school teachers, receive retirement benefits in the form of a defined-benefit (DB) pension, paid as a lifetime annuity. Pension payments are a function of the final average salary (typically calculated as the average salary over the few highest years of earnings in covered employment) and years of plan-covered service.
Service years are multiplied by a "formula factor," which is often around 2 percent for teachers, to yield a replacement rate of the final average salary in retirement. For example, a 30-year worker with a 2-percent formula factor would receive 60 percent of her final average salary annually.
Plans vary in how cost-of-living adjustments are incorporated after retirement.
Public pension plans are designed to be self-funded at the cohort level. The formula-based benefit structure does not tie workers' own contributions to their own benefits directly, and in fact facilitates significant resource transfers between workers (e.g., between short-career and longcareer workers-e.g., see Costrell and Podgursky, 2010; Friedberg and Webb, 2005; McGee and Winters, 2013) . But the idea is that each year contributions by employees, and on their behalf by employers and states, collectively cover the actuarial present value of benefits accrued for that
year. The cost of providing retirement benefits for services performed by current workers is referred as the "normal cost" by pension actuaries.
The annual required contribution (ARC) to fund a pension plan, calculated as a percentage of worker salaries, is a combination of the normal cost and the cost of paying down the unfunded actuarially accrued liability (UAAL). The UAAL is effectively debt from past plan operations. It is amortized as dictated by the accounting rules of a plan, which set the amortization window and determine whether the UAAL is re-amortized each year.
Contributions to the plan on behalf of teachers are made by a combination of the teachers themselves, their employers (school districts), and state governments. The contributing groups vary across states, as do their formal contribution shares. States typically link the statutory contribution rate (SCR) to the ARC, sometimes with constraints (e.g., a state statute might limit how fast the statutory contribution rate can rise annually regardless of how the ARC is changing), but this is not always the case (e.g., California prior to 2014). As a matter of accounting, the cost of servicing a plan's UAAL is borne by employers, and/or the state. A portion of employer and state contributions also go toward the normal cost. Employee contributions are used for normal cost only. Of course, knowing which parties make pension contributions in an accounting sense need not be informative about incidence, motivating the empirical analysis that follows.
The ARC is the product of actuarial calculations that make assumptions along a variety of dimensions including, among other things, life expectancies, career longevities, the wage profiles (especially wages in years leading up to retirement, which typically determine the final average salary). The most controversial assumption is the high assumed rate of return on assets, which is also the rate used to discount liabilities. In recent history this rate has typically been around 8 percent in public plans nationally. While some states have reduced the nominal rate in recent years; on average across the U.S., the real assumed rate of return has gone up because of downward adjustments to inflation assumptions (Biggs, 2018) . Because worker benefits are guaranteed, financial economists have argued that a risk-free real rate is more appropriate (Biggs, 2011; Munnell, Aubry and Cafarelli, 2015; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009 , 2011 .
The high assumed rate of return is made more problematic by asymmetric responses to periods of below-and above-average performance of the investment portfolio. For example, Koedel, Ni and Podgursky (2014) show that teacher plans across the U.S. implemented retroactive, unfunded benefit improvements in the late 1990s and early 2000s on the heels of an impressive stock-market boom. The boom temporarily inflated pension fund balance sheets and the benefit improvements were rationalized by plans' better-than-average investment returns. Compensating benefit cuts did not occur after the 2001 stock market correction. Moreover, even pension reductions that have occurred since 2008-when they've occurred-are smaller in magnitude than the benefit improvements documented by Koedel, Ni and Podgursky (2014) . Responding asymmetrically to periods of above-and below-average returns in this way ensures long-term debt accrual even if the pension portfolio makes the high assumed rate of return on average. Because of funds' persistent inability to meet the assumed rate of return on assets, made worse by asymmetric modifications to benefit formulas, UAALs have been accruing rapidly in most state and municipal plans across the U.S. As liabilities rise, the asset-to-liability ratio in a plan falls (all else equal), which triggers increases in the ARC. Backes et al. (2016) document that for new teachers as of 2015, the average per-worker cost of servicing the unfunded liability reported by state plans in the U.S. was just over 10 percent of salaries. The variance of the ARC across states also increased over time as shown in column 3.
The rising trend in the ARC is driven predominantly by the cost of servicing UAALs. Figure 1 uses the Illinois plan as an illustrative example. The UAAL is fairly flat through 2007, then rises with the onset of the Great Recession and continues to grow thereafter. The ARC trend follows the UAAL trend closely. Note that in the aggregate data in Table 1 , the average ARC begins to rise in the early 2000s, before the Great Recession. Although this could be partly explained by modest fluctuations in the economy, such as the "dotcom crash" in the early 2000s, this explanation is unsatisfying because on the whole, from the mid-1990s (after the savings and loan crisis) through 2007 was a period of strong returns in financial markets and general economic prosperity in the U.S. A better explanation is the combination of the high assumed rate of return on assets and the widespread, unfunded benefit improvements in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
While changes to normal cost also impact the ARC trend in Table 1 , normal cost did not change quickly over the time period we study. Moreover, to the extent that it did change, it declined because benefits have been reduced. The decline in the normal cost has been modest because teachers-like other public-sector employees-are typically grandfathered into the benefit structure into which they are hired when faced with benefit reductions, so incumbents have not been affected. Because the benefit changes that occurred during our data panel have only applied to new hires, the effect on normal cost calculations over the entire workforce has been modest.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We construct a state-level data panel spanning the years 2001-2015 with information about the size of each state's teaching workforce, teacher salaries, and details about the DB pension plan covering public educators. Our panel includes 49 states and the District of Columbia. 6 Among the 50 plans, 27 cover educators exclusively, another 4-Colorado, Kansas, Maryland and Tennessee-have a formal educator division within a larger consolidated plan, and the remaining 19 states have consolidated plans that cover educators along with other public employees. 7 For separate educator plans and consolidated plans with a formal educator division, we use financial data relevant to educators. For the consolidated plans without a formal educator division, we use financial data for the whole plan. These decisions allow us to connect the relevant financial information about the pension plan for teachers to the labor outcomes we consider.
The financial information about the plans is taken primarily from plan-provided AVRs and CAFRs. In cases where the AVR and CAFR are not available, we supplement our dataset with the Public Plans Database (PPD) maintained by the Center on Retirement Research at Boston College. 8 Our data on total teacher salary expenditures, average teacher salaries, and the number of teachers employed in each state come from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and cover public elementary and secondary schools. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on teacher salary expenditures, teacher employment, and basic economic conditions of states, overall and split into the pre-and post-recession periods.
Total salaries and the average size of the teacher workforce decreased from the pre-to post-6 Alaska is excluded because its DB pension plan was closed in 2006. For states with both DB and DC plans, we use data from the DB plan in our analysis. For states with both DB and hybrid plans, we combine the DB and the DB component of the hybrid plans. For states with only hybrid plans, we take the DB component of the hybrid plans. None of our findings are qualitatively influenced by reasonable adjustments to these procedures, including dropping states with hybrid plans or DC plan options. 7 Non-certified educational staff (e.g., secretaries and maintenance) may or may not be covered by the same pension plans as teachers. For this analysis, we take information from the teacher plan whenever it is distinguishable in AVRs and CAFRs. 8 The data taken directly from plan reports are preferable for two reasons. First, the PPD combines funding statistics in plans that cover multiple member groups, which prevents us from isolating the teacher potion of plans in some states. Second, we identify some discrepancies between the PPD and the data provided by plan reports, particularly in the early years of the data panel.
recession periods, and the cross-state variance in both variables also declined. Average salaries remained essentially flat. Economic conditions are as expected-the level and variance of unemployment across states increased in the post-2008 period and average state-level GDP is only modestly higher.
Methodology

4.1
Core Specifications
Consider the following regression of teacher salary expenditures on the statutory pension contribution rate, based on conceptually similar investigations of healthcare cost incidence by Clemens and Cutler (2014) and Lubotsky and Olson (2015) :
In equation (1), , jt Y is total salary expenditures for state j in year t and , jt c is the teacher contribution rate to the pension plan, 0≤c<1. Thus, the dependent variable is the natural log of total salary expenditures net of teachers' own required pension contributions-loosely speaking, teachers' total "take-home pay." Netting out direct employee pension costs from the dependent variable is important because it allows the model to pick up cost pass-through via teachers' own contributions. For example, suppose that when total pension contributions increase, employee contributions are raised to fully cover the higher cost. 9 If our dependent variable did not net out teachers' own pension contributions (i.e., if we replaced ,, (1
, the model would not detect the incidence on teacher salaries because NCES data measure salaries prior to teachers' pension contributions (like with other benefit payments teachers make). This is similar to how Lubotsky and Olson (2015) account for employees' own contributions to their health insurance premiums. 10
The vector j,t X includes time-varying state economic controls-namely, the log of GDP and the unemployment rate. 11 , j t k SCR  is the variable of interest-the statutory contribution rate for the teacher pension plan in state j for year t-k (we elaborate on timing issues below). Because the total salary variable is in logs and the SCR is defined in units of salary percentage points, the estimate of 2 Given the conceptual weakness of using the SCR directly in the model, we favor an approach linking teacher salary expenditures to variation in the ARC. Although the ARC may still be endogenous-an issue that we elaborate on in the next subsection-it is not as susceptible to endogeneity as the SCR because it is purely an actuarial calculation. Equation (2) matches equation (1), but replaces the SCR with the ARC:
This specification gives the reduced-form conditional relationship between the ARC and teacher salary expenditures.
Moreover, we can build on this approach by isolating ARC-driven variation in the SCR with an instrumental variables analog to equation (1), using the following two-stage model:
Equation (4) matches equation (1) except that the parameter of interest, 2  , is identified using only ARC-driven variation in the SCR (through equation 3). Both the ARC and SCR are measured in percentage points of teacher salaries and consistent with intuition, the results from equation (3) indicate a strong mapping between them. Specifically, we estimate the first stage coefficient 2  under various values of k to be roughly 0.75. This implies that estimates of 2  and 2  , from equations (2) and (4) respectively, will be similar, which they are (see below).
Finally, we note that all of our models are estimated using state-level data because teacher pension plans are administered at the state level. 12 Although salary decisions are primarily local (i.e., made at the district level), using district-level salary data offers little value over our approach-which is effectively to bring the outcome data to the same level of aggregation as the treatment data-given the state-level treatments and corresponding clustering structure. 13 This aspect of our study differs from that of Clemens and Cutler (2014) and Lubotsky and Olson (2015) , who use district-level data in their analyses of healthcare cost incidence because health benefits are determined at the district rather than state level.
Exogeneity and Identifying Variation of the ARC
Because of the aforementioned endogeneity concerns with the SCR, our preferred models rely on variation in the ARC for identification. The ARC is an appealing measure of pension costs because it is based on an objective function of the fiscal health of a plan and plan accounting rules. 14 But while the ARC is an improvement over the SCR in the sense that the potential for endogeneity is less severe, endogeneity concerns with the ARC remain.
The potential for bias in our models must come from state-level dynamic factors that influence both the ARC and teacher salaries, which would be unaccounted for by the state fixed effects. Perhaps the most obvious issue within the context of our analysis is that state pension plans overweight companies with in-state headquarters in their portfolios (Brown, Pollet and Weisbenner, 2015) . This is likely to induce a dynamic correlation between asset returns within a plan (and thus the ARC) and the local economy, which in turn could affect salary expenditures on teachers.
reside. Moreover, as would be predicted if our measures of pension costs across the full teaching workforce are less precise in these states, our cost-incidence estimates disattenuate marginally (and insignificantly) when we drop them from the sample. 13 This inference follows directly from Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) . 14 Certainly in terms of intent this is an accurate description of the ARC, although we cannot rule out nefarious behavior. For example, pension boards could put pressure on actuaries, for whom the pension plans are clients, to set assumptions in order to produce a desired outcome (e.g., a better funded ratio). Such behavior would be hard to detect in pension plan documents but is possible.
The time-varying economic controls in the X-vector are included in the model in an effort to reduce bias from this source. In addition, below we show that our findings are substantively similar regardless of whether we include or omit these variables, which indicates limited potential for bias from omitted state-level economic controls. Upon further examination, the reason for the insensitivity of our estimates is that changes in economic conditions within states over time are only weakly correlated with changes in the ARC. To give an empirical sense of the relationship, we separately regress jt ARC and jt GDP on state and year effects to produce the residualized values jt ARC and jt GDP , respectively, and then correlate the two series. The correlation is small and statistically insignificant (-0.026). 15 The weak correlation is not entirely unexpected because the own-state bias in pension plan portfolios, while clearly present, is not overwhelming (Brown, Pollet and Weisbenner, 2015) . Moreover, the ARC is typically calculated as a moving average, which smooths out fluctuations. 16 Another concern with using the ARC is that it can be influenced by future contribution rate commitments. A recent illustrative example is California, which is 2014 passed legislation to raise the SCR over a 7-year period. Because a (sizeable) component of the ARC is the amortized unfunded liability, future commitments to pay affect current actuarial calculations of the immediate ARC. Put another way, if it is known that more money will be available in the future to pay down unfunded liabilities, this information is factored into today's actuarial calculations 15 We test the significance of the correlation by regressing jt ARC on jt GDP with state clustering. The correlation is statistically insignificant (p-value=0.85). There is a similarly weak and insignificant correlation between the residualized state unemployment rate and the residualized ARC (correlation=0.157; p-value=0.11). State GDP fluctuations are a much stronger conditional predictor of teacher salary expenditures than fluctuations in the state unemployment rate (see below). 16 Because of the smoothing, in results omitted for brevity we also estimated time-staggered correlations between residualized ARC and the economic variables that align previous-year economic conditions to contemporaneous ARC. We find similarly weak and insignificant correlations. and lowers the current amount needed. This can lead to a situation in which a lower ARC today is the product of known increases in pension costs in the future. Forward-looking school districts could react proactively, which would positively bias the coefficient on the ARC in equation (2).
That is, in the data we would see the ARC decline in year t, and in anticipation of a higher SCR in some year t+k, teacher salary expenditures would also decline in year t. 17 We are not aware of any scheduled increases to the SCR akin to the California example prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, although many states have experienced substantial increases to the SCR since, we are not aware of other scheduled increases that are so explicit. 18
This lessens concerns about anticipatory bias in our estimates, although if such bias is present it is more likely to manifest in the post-recession years of our data panel given that SCR increases are more prevalent. The implication is that our estimates using post-recession data have more potential to be biased positively. This is in the opposite direction of what our estimates imply about how the ARC affects teacher salary expenditures differently before and after 2008, suggesting that our differential findings in this regard may be conservative.
More broadly, it is useful to consider the factors that drive the identifying variation we use in the ARC. Again, with the state and year fixed effects in the model, the identifying variation occurs within states and over time, conditional on the national time trend. This slice of variation 17 While in principle scheduled future reductions to the SCR could work in the opposite direction, in practice we are not aware of any scheduled reductions to the SCR that occurred in any state over the course of our data panel. Also note that while the California example is useful for illustration, it does not impact our analysis in a meaningful way because the legislation was not introduced until 2014, leaving just one year of our data panel (2015) for which an anticipatory effect could occur. 18 Many states have experienced sustained, rising SCRs that are primarily the product of state statutes tying the SCR to the ARC in some way. In these scenarios, school district administrators who understand the pension plans and their state statutes could predict future rising rates, but not precisely and there is no schedule of rising rates that could be consulted as in California.
accounts for about 15 percent of the total variance in the ARC in our data. 19 Within-state factors that influence the ARC include investment returns on the pension portfolio, changes to actuarial assumptions, and changes to accounting rules. Demographic shifts could also influence the ARC, but only if they are sharp and unexpected. Predictable demographic shifts, such as spike in retirements due to a bulge of retirement-aged workers, will not affect the ARC because such shifts are built into the actuarial calculations.
On the whole, the above-mentioned sources of variation are generally appealing from an identification perspective. Perhaps the cleanest source of variation is year-to-year fluctuations in the investment return on the pension portfolio. In results that we omit for brevity, we attempted to reproduce our instrumental-variables models described above using the portfolio investment return as the instrument (equation 3), but unfortunately the first stage was too weak to have any traction.
This implies that within-state variation in investment returns (again, conditional on the national time trend) is insufficient to support our analysis alone. Changes to actuarial assumptions and accounting rules are also plausibly exogenous sources of variation in the ARC and these surely contribute to the variance we leverage in our models-e.g., if actuaries update their life tables, or if there is a change to the amortization period of the UAAL-but these changes are difficult to track comprehensively across plans and years so we were unable to develop an identification strategy that isolates specific assumptions or rule changes. 20 Our estimates rely collectively on all of the variation in the ARC that occurs within states over time, conditional on the national time trend.
Effect Timing
With regard to timing, note that state plans report ARC values prospectively. For example, in Arizona, the actuarial valuation report published in year t-2 reports the projected ARC for year t. We construct the data panel so that k=0 indicates an ARC value that applies to school-year t,
reported in year t-xs, where xs can vary by state. We report estimates from models where k=0,1,2 because of uncertainty about the timing of any pension-cost effects. Forward-looking school districts with complete flexibility of wage offers should respond to the year t ARC with year t wages, in which case k=0 is appropriate. However, districts may not fully internalize projected cost changes until they hit the budget. This could result in effects that occur with a lag such that, for example, a value of k=1 or k=2 would capture the effect better.
A related timing issue is wage rigidity. Because labor negotiations occur at different times for different districts within a state, but pension coverage is centralized statewide, any effect of the ARC on salary expenditures using lag structure k, on average, will be the product of heterogeneous responses across districts within a state owing to differences in negotiating status. Put another way,
in any year t, a fraction of districts will be negotiating teacher salaries and others will be locked into a contract. Conceptually we would expect wage rigidity of this nature to attenuate our estimates and to the extent that this is an issue, a longer lag structure should allow us to observe larger effects. However, as we show below, there is no evidence of larger crowd-out effects with a longer lag structure, which suggests that wage rigidity is unlikely to be suppressing our estimates.
In fact, the results indicate that the crowd-out mechanism is changes in the size of the workforce, not average salaries, and workforce size is much easier for districts to manipulate than wages within the confines of a labor contract.
Pre-and Post-Recession Effect Heterogeneity
Finally, we hypothesize that the incidence of pension costs may differ depending on macroeconomic conditions and leverage our data panel spanning the Great Recession to test this possibility. We expand the models in Equation (2)-(4) to allow for effect heterogeneity in the preand post-recession years; the expanded version of Equation (2) is as follows:
Like terms in Equations (2) and (5) We also estimate instrumental variables models analogous to equation (5), but following the structure of equations (3) and (4). We use , Table 3 shows estimated coefficients on the SCR and ARC variables from Equations (1) and (2). Each column is a separate regression. The first three columns show results from Equation
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(1) and the last three columns are for Equation (2). For each model we show results using the three different lag structures (k=0,1,2) . The sample size declines as we increase the number of lags because doing so shrinks the effective size of the data panel.
The estimates in columns (4)-(6) using the ARC, which we prefer, are negative and of moderate magnitude, but are noisily estimated and not statistically significant. For example, taken at face value, our estimate for k=0 from the state-fixed-effects model implies that a one-percentage-point increase in the ARC corresponds to a 0.06 percent reduction in total salary expenditures. The upper-bound crowd-out estimate is around 35 percent given the size of the standard error. This estimate is similar to estimates from the health insurance literature based on similar models, in terms of both its magnitude and precision. For example, the analogous point estimate from the primary specification in Clemens and Cutler (2014) indicates a 15 percent reduction in salaries with a standard error of 33 percent. 21
Next, in Table 4 we show results from the instrumental variables models. The first stage output is reported in the appendix (Appendix Table A .1)-as noted above, the first stage shows a strong but imperfect correspondence between the SCR and the ARC. The first stage F-statistics are sufficiently large (ranging from 30-45 depending on the lag structure). The findings in Table   4 are similar to what we show in Table 3 , although the estimates are somewhat more negative and less precise. None are approaching statistical significance at conventional levels.
Next we allow for effect heterogeneity between the pre-and post-recession periods. First,
in Table 5 we report on estimates from the model shown by Equation (5) The k=0 coefficient indicates a differential crowd-out effect during the post-recession period of 24 percent. 22
The results from the analogous instrumental variables regressions are substantively similar and reported in Table 6 . Again, output from the first-stage regressions is reported in the appendix (Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3) . The post-period coefficients in these models range nominally from -0.0018 to -0.0027, corresponding to crowd-out effects of pension contributions on teacher salary expenditures of 18-27 percent. Again only the k=0 coefficient is statistically significant. As noted above, the negative relative coefficients for the post-2008 period in Tables 5 and 6 are obtained despite the increased potential for positive bias in these parameter estimates. 23
Robustness and Extensions
We test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of model covariates in Appendix   Table A .4, which shows results from models that exclude the time-varying state economic characteristics in the X-vector. For brevity we show these results only for the reduced-form models using the ARC-i.e., from Equation (5) as reported on in Table 5 -although the lack of sensitivity of our findings to including these controls holds up throughout our analysis. These results are consistent with the weak relationship between residual variation in the economic covariates and the ARC within states over time as documented above.
We also examine the robustness of our findings to restricting the analytic sample to the balanced panel of 41 state plans from 2003-2015 in Appendix Table A .5. The state and time fixed 22 The total post-period crowd-out effects are mostly lower if we take the pre-2008 coefficients-which are statistically insignificant but nominally positive in two of the three scenarios-at face value. For example, in the k=0 model, the total post-period crowd-out effect estimate is -0.0011, or [0.0013-0.0024]. 23 Again, the suggested mechanism for the bias is that after 2008 many states experienced sustained increases in the SCR, whether through a formal commitment as in the California example or, more often, informally through state statutes that tie the SCR to the ARC. If districts anticipate these increases and it affects their contemporaneous hiring decisions, then anticipatory bias would result. Whether this is an issue in practice is unclear and we are not aware of any research on this topic to date. But to the extent that this is an issue, our estimates for the differential crowd-out between the pre-and post-recession periods will be too small. effects should in principle account for any composition effects associated with the unbalanced panel going back to 2001, but this robustness test is meant to provide additional assurance. We again highlight results from models that match those shown in Table 5 . As anticipated, the results in Appendix Table A .5 are substantively similar to what we show in the main text, although the coefficients attenuate marginally and are no longer statistically significant.
Finally, we look for evidence that crowd-out is differentially present in consolidated versus teacher-only plans. As mentioned previously, in 27 states teachers are in their own plans, while in the other states teachers belong to larger consolidated plans that also cover other public-sector employees. It is reasonable to expect similar crowd out across different types of plans, although hypotheses that support differential effects can be imagined. For example, one possibility is that teachers are more politically powerful than other public-sector employees. In such a scenario, they may be better positioned to negotiate the effects of rising pension costs in plans exclusive to them.
Appendix Table A .6 explores the potential for differential effects of rising pension costs among teachers by plan type, again replicating the basic structure of Table 5 . The estimates lose precision when we split the data by plan type, but there is no indication that crowd-out rates differ between consolidated and teacher-only plans.
Mechanisms
We extend our analysis by examining two different ways that districts can distribute cost incidence within the "salary expenditures" bundle: (1) reduce (or not increase) teacher salaries, and (2) reduce (or not increase) the number of teaching positions. In Tables 7 and 8 we replicate the analysis in Table 5 , but divide total salary expenditures into these two parts: average salary and the total number of teachers (the total number of teachers is measured in full-time-equivalents as reported by the NCES). This allows us to gain insight into the mechanism(s) by which total expenditures are reduced. Table 7 shows results from models where we replace total salary expenditures with the state-average teacher salary in Equation (5). None of the coefficients on the ARC variables are statistically significant and there is no pre/post-recession shift. Moreover, the post-period coefficients are nominally positive. We find no evidence that average teacher salaries are influenced by ARC fluctuations in either the pre-or post-recession period. 24
Next we examine effects on the size of the teaching workforce. Table 8 shows models analogous to Equation (5) but where the dependent variable is the number of PK-12 teachers, in logs. The table makes clear that this is the margin for effect. While there is not a significant relationship between the ARC and the size of the teaching workforce in the pre-recession period, in the post-recession period increases in the ARC correspond to a smaller workforce. 25 The estimated effects of the ARC in Table 8 are the most precisely estimated effects in all of our analyses. A review of the results in Tables 7 & 8 shows why: the null and nominally positive postrecession relationship between the ARC and average salaries-noting the inclusion of average salaries in the "total salary expenditures" dependent variable-obfuscates the effect of the ARC where it is truly most impactful, which is in terms of affecting the size of the teaching workforce. 26 24 It has been well documented that demographic changes among the teaching workforce are putting downward pressure on average wages nationally (Schmitz, 2016) , but this general trend should be captured in the models shown in Table 7 by the year fixed effects. 25 Lubotsky and Olson (2015) also find that school districts do not reduce the size of the workforce in response to rising health insurance costs during the pre-recession period (but their data do not go past 2008 to examine postrecession years). 26 Unfortunately, the NCES data are not sufficient to determine the extent to which the workforce reduction is from reduced hiring or increased exits. The models capture the total effect of exits and new entrants on the size of the teaching workforce.
Conclusion
Public defined-benefit (DB) pension costs are rising rapidly and all indications point toward continued increases due to unmet actuarial assumptions that result in the accumulation of unfunded liabilities (Biggs, 2011; Munnell, Aubry and Cafarelli, 2015; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009 , 2011 . The incidence of rising pension costs is unclear and to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate cost incidence on salary expenditures for covered workers. Our empirical analysis is based on a data panel of 50 state plans that cover public educators over 15 years spanning the Great Recession.
We find no evidence of pension-cost incidence on salary expenditures prior to the Great
Recession, but there is a shift in the post-recession period such that salary expenditures are reduced when pension costs rise. Supplementary models indicate that incidence is on the extensive rather than intensive margin-that is, the effect operates through changes in the size of the teaching workforce, not average teacher salaries. Thus, our findings imply that rising pension costs in recent years have resulted in larger workloads for teachers and reduced educational services (e.g., in the form of large class sizes). It is not clear if the nature and level of incidence we document is enough to influence the historical support of DB pension plans by teacher labor groups (Weingarten, 2017). Fitzpatrick's (2015) low estimate of the marginal value of pension benefits for teachers (of 20 cents on the dollar) is similar in magnitude to the level of cost incidence we estimate since 2008, and our analysis suggests that salaries of incumbents (who are disproportionately likely to be represented by organized labor) are unaffected. Labor groups also have other reasons to support public pension plans (Even and Macpherson, 2014) .
The heterogeneity in pension-cost incidence between the pre-and post-recession periods can be explained by public agencies having limited options for dealing with rising pension costs during times of fiscal stress. We also emphasize the countercyclical nature of pension-cost increases, which are triggered by declines in asset-to-liability ratios and thus sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. This likely exacerbates the recession-related effect heterogeneity we identify. It would be of interest to examine the uniqueness of this aspect of our findings to pension costs. Health benefit costs should be similarly difficult for government agencies to manage during recessions, but unlike with pensions, there is no reason to expect health benefit costs to fluctuate counter-cyclically. 27
Finally, we conclude with brief mention of another form of incidence that differs among teachers within the workforce and is not examined here. As noted previously, since the turn of the century changes to plan benefits have been in the direction of reduced benefits for new entrants.
Incumbent teachers are grandfathered into the previous, more-generous benefit structures. 28 The monetary value of benefit reductions for new employees is not incorporated into our analysis, but the pension "tiers" under which new hires have been enrolled in many state plans of late provide lower benefits to workers but require the same contributions (by employees and employers).
Teachers covered by the more-and less-generous tiers work on the same salary schedules.
Therefore, within the teaching workforce, younger workers have been disproportionately affected in terms of total compensation inclusive of the value of pension benefits. 27 We are not aware of any comparable analysis of effect heterogeneity in the literature on health benefit costs. The data panels used by Cutler and Clemens (2014) and Lubotsky and Olson (2015 ) end in 2007 and 2008 The data panel used by Anand (2016) ends in 2010 but is predominantly pre-recession, and she does not explore the potential for differential crowd-out before and after the recession. 28 As of 2013, the following states enrolled new entrants into a sub-plan/tier that was less generous than the plan in which some other more experienced teachers were enrolled: AL, AZ, DE, IL, IN, KS, KY, MS, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR, SC, PA, UT, VT, WA, WI, and WY (Backes et al., 2016) . 
